Connecting Dots

Tata Trusts Row: Why the Board Should Release the Minutes

Bombay House, the Tata Sons headquarters — the Tata Trusts row over board minutes, the Companies Act position on inspection of board records and what the Docomo settlement said about the Group's conduct.

Somewhere in Bombay House there is a letter. It was written on behalf of the owner of two-thirds of Tata Sons, addressed to the company’s Secretary, and it asks for the minutes of a board meeting and the recording that was made of it.

Read that again. The shareholder holding 66 per cent of India’s largest industrial group has had to write in and ask what happened in its own boardroom.

There is nothing improper in the request. It may well have been necessary. But consider what it tells you about the state of the house.

Consider too what the law does with such a letter. Under the Companies Act the minutes of a general meeting are open to every member. Board minutes are not. A shareholder — holding one share, or two-thirds of the company — has no statutory right to see them. He may ask. He may be refused.

So the position today is this. The majority owner of Tata Sons must request, as a matter of grace, the record of a meeting at which its own nominee director voted against what was passed.

Note also that nothing here must be reconstructed. Where a board meets by video conference the rules require the proceedings to be recorded and preserved. The record is sitting in the company’s own files. The only question is whether the owner of the company may see it.

A company whose owner must apply in writing to learn what its board decided does not have a governance dispute. It has something broken inside it.

And none of this is a question of law. It is a question of conduct. Which is why I want to go back nine years.


The Docomo standard

When Ratan Tata returned to Bombay House as interim chairman in October 2016, the first thing he set about fixing was NTT Docomo. Not the share price, not the succession, not the fight with his predecessor. He went to the one matter where the Group’s word was in question, for a simple reason: the Tatas had agreed to pay, so the Tatas would pay.

A good defence was available. The company had argued RBI rules forbade buying back shares at a pre-agreed price, and it could have litigated for years. In February 2017 the board, by then led by Mr N. Chandrasekaran, withdrew every objection before the Delhi High Court, “as a gesture of good faith and in accordance with the Tata Group’s long-standing record of adherence to contractual commitments.” Over a billion dollars went out of the door on the strength of a promise, not a judgment.

That is the house we are talking about. It did not ask what it could get away with. It asked what it had promised.

Read what is being written in defence of the same board today and you find something else. Can an affirmative-vote clause bind a board majority? Does a nominee director’s duty release him from the shareholder who put him there? Opinion after opinion, all technical, none of it touching the only question an ordinary reader is asking.

Was this a wise thing to do?


The sequence

Nobody is answering that. So, consider the sequence. None of it is in dispute.

In March 2024, this same board examined a public listing. It concluded unanimously, under the guidance of Mr Ratan Tata, that Tata Sons should remain unlisted. Then it backed that decision with money. It cleared the entire debt of Rs 21,813 crore and asked the RBI to let it surrender its core investment company registration.

Seven months later Ratan Tata was gone. A regulator might have treated his last wish with some grace, granting the deregistration subject to whatever audit and disclosure it thought necessary. Instead, the file sat for 28 months. On 12 September 2026 the answer came back: no.

Now watch what the board did with the next five days.

On 12 August the Chairman had told his fellow directors he would not seek another term. The Trusts accepted it the next day and asked the company to find a successor. On 3 September the Nomination and Remuneration Committee invited him to reconsider. On 17 September, with the RBI’s refusal barely a week old, the board handed him five more years and cleared the path towards the listing it had itself rejected eighteen months earlier. Noel Tata, for the owner of two-thirds of the company, voted against both. That evening the Trusts called the resolution a nullity. The next morning the market marked the Group down.

Here is what I cannot reconcile. When Ratan Tata’s wish needed defending before the RBI, this board did not fight to the last. When the owner’s objection stood in the way of a chairmanship, it voted straight through.


The law is no refuge

Article 121 requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the Trusts’ nominee directors. There are two. Both must say yes. One said no. When that clause was attacked as oppressive in the Mistry litigation, the Supreme Court refused to touch it, reminding everyone that the Articles are the company’s constitution.

And if the Executive Chairman is a whole-time director, the appointment must travel back to a general meeting, where the Trusts hold 66 per cent. A board that votes for what it knows cannot be implemented has not governed. It has gestured.

Then there is the rule the Group wrote for itself: retirement at 65 for executives, 75 for others. It was Ratan Tata’s own instrument, and he used it on men no chairman would have chosen to cross. Russi Mody at Tata Steel. Darbari Seth at Tata Chemicals. Ajit Kerkar at Indian Hotels. Each retired by the rule. That is why it commanded respect for thirty years. Twenty-six listed companies still live under it. When the next executive director asks for a year beyond 65, what does the Group tell him?

In decades of advising boards, I have written my share of opinions defending difficult decisions. So let me say what every lawyer knows. When a client’s conduct can be justified, you lead with the conduct. When it cannot, you lead with the clause. The volume of legal commentary since 17 September is not strength. It is a confession.


Back to the letter

Which brings me back to that letter to the Company Secretary.

A board confident of what it had done would not have needed to be asked. It would have sent the minutes across the same week, with the recording, and invited the owner to say what it thought. Openness costs nothing when there is nothing to explain.

There is a simpler test here than any of the opinions now in circulation. Ask whether everyone in that room would be comfortable if the country watched the recording. If the answer is yes, send it today. If it is no, then that is also the answer to every other question being debated.

The Tatas did not earn this country’s trust in courtrooms. They earned it by paying Docomo when they could have litigated, and by retiring their own titans when it would have been easier to look away. That inheritance was never written into any Article. It cannot be defended by one either.

And it certainly cannot be defended by making the owner write in for the minutes.

— Nitin


Connecting Dots — every fortnight, I take a deal, a policy, or a person and tell you the thinking behind it. Insights and instincts.

nitin@nitinpotdar.com

All editions