Connecting Dots

When the CEO Chairs the Board, Who Owns the Company?

An empty boardroom table — combining the roles of chairman and chief executive, the limits of a nominee director's mandate under Section 166 and what founders should write into their Articles before handing a company to professionals.

The Tata episode has put a million-dollar question before every founder and promoter in India.

This piece is not about N. Chandrasekaran of Tata Sons. His record is his own and I offer no comment on it. It is about a structure, and a question every founder must now ask.


What happened in Tata Sons

The facts are short. The Tata Group retires its executives at 65, a rule Ratan Tata himself put in place. On 12 August 2026 the Chairman said he would not seek another term. The next day the Tata Trusts accepted it and asked for a selection committee as the Articles require. On 3 September a board committee (NRC) asked him to reconsider. On 17 September the board reappointed him for five years. Of the two directors nominated by the Tata Trusts, one voted for, one against. The Trusts call the resolution a nullity.


The Owner at the door

Since then, Tata Trusts, the owner of two-thirds of India’s largest group, has written letters, filed caveats, collected opinions from former judges and asked for the video recording of its own company’s board meeting. Its annual general meeting failed for want of quorum. One of its founding trusts has been told by the Charity Commissioner not to meet. The other faces complaints seeking to keep its chairman out of the shareholders’ meeting.

The majority owner is going from pillar to post to cast its vote. Whatever one thinks of the merits, that should worry every promoter in the country.


The Executive Chairman

The first lesson is about the chair. A chief executive runs the business. A chairman runs the board, and the board is where owners call management to account. Put both jobs in one pair of hands and the man being supervised also presides over his supervisors. He sets the agenda. He controls what the board sees. He guides the room that decides his own future.

In good times nobody notices. But the day owner and manager part ways, the owner finds himself outside the room, filing caveats, and the manager at the head of the table.


The Nominee Director

The second lesson is harder. Owners have always assumed that if they put their people on the board, their voice will be heard there. Tata Sons’ Article 121 gives the Trusts’ nominees an affirmative vote on key matters, and the Supreme Court upheld that design in 2021.

Yet 17 September showed its limit. A nominee director is not his nominator’s agent. Under Section 166 of the Companies Act he is legally bound to follow the Articles; but he also owes his duty to the company and all its stakeholders. He may weigh his nominator’s interest, but he cannot be told how to vote. So, an owner who expects his nominee to stand by him is relying on hope, not law.

Lord Denning saw this coming more than sixty years ago. In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer he said that so long as the interests of all concerned were in harmony, there was no difficulty. But once they were in conflict, “the nominee directors were placed in an impossible position.”

The law has named the problem. It has never solved it. In my considered view, the answer is simple. A nominee caught in that position has two honourable choices. He may recuse himself, or he may resign. What he should not do is stay in the chair and decide against the very owner who put him there.

And if the board, without him, cannot decide, the matter must go to the next forum: the shareholders’ meeting. And till such time such resolution be kept in abeyance. That is where owners speak for themselves. Our law already does this for directors with a personal interest in a transaction. It is time it did the same for nominees.


What Founders should do?

Founders must hand their companies to professionals. The question is how to do so and remain owners.

My opinion: Keep the chairman and the chief executive separate, come what may.

Write succession into the Articles: who decides, how, and by when. An owner should not discover his rights in the middle of a dispute.

Give the owner’s consent a place in the boardroom on matters of control, as Tata Sons did. But add what Tata Sons did not: a rule that a conflicted nominee director must step aside, and that a deadlocked board must send the question to the shareholders.

And treat retirement rules as sacred. A rule bent once will be tested again.


The lesson

Ratan Tata built a house in which owners chose managers and managers served at the owners’ pleasure. It worked because everyone knew where authority began.

Founders are now watching whether that understanding survives. If the owner of two-thirds must fight to be heard in its own company, each of them will ask the same question before handing over the keys. Once I give my company a chairman, will I still have a company?

— Nitin


Connecting Dots — every fortnight, I take a deal, a policy, or a person and tell you the thinking behind it. Insights and instincts.

nitin@nitinpotdar.com

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